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REMEMBER THE FUTURE? 
THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AS 
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FORM 
Peter Osborne 
The Communist Manifesto is without doubt the most influential single 
text written in the nineteenth century, in any language, by some 
considerable way. Indeed, it may stand as a metonym for the desire 
called 'history' which coursed through that century in the wake of the 
French Revolution. Situated at the hinge between Hobsbawm's ages of 
revolution and capital (1789-1848 and 1848-1870), as described in 
the first two volumes of his great trilogy on the long 19th century, from 
the French Revolution to the First World War,' the Manifesto presents 
the historical dialectic between these two terms ('revolution' and 
'capital') in two equally extraordinary, though no longer equally 
convincing, ways: from the standpoint of the prospectively successive 
revolutionary historical roles of the social classes of the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat, respectively. It is in the disjunction between these two 
presentations that the meaning of the text must be sought today. For 
with the disappearance of the horizon of proletarian revolution, and 
the retreat to the spirit world of the famous 'spectre' of communism, 
the text has undergone a profound transformation. In short, the 
Manifesto appears to have been transformed from an eschatological 
tour &force, in which the end of capitalism was assured ('What the 
bourgeoisie . . . produces, above all, is its own gavedigger<), into what 
Marshall Berman has notoriously described as a 'lyrical celebration of 
bourgeois works'? a celebration, more specifically, of the revolutionary 
temporality of capitalism; a capitalism which - without a hndamental 
countervailing force - appears now as open-ended. From the stand- 
point of the philosophy of history, communism as the eschatological 
absolute has given way to the 'bad infinity' of capitalism - 'the affir- 
mation as negation of the finite'3 - capitalism without end, amen. 
O r  at least, so it would seem. But does the rest of the Manifesto 
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belong unambiguously to a shape of life grown old? Or  is there another 
sense in which it is still a 'living' text, afier the fall of historical 
communism? Is there, perhaps, new life in it today? What lives in the 
Communist Manifesto? In particular - and this is the question I shall 
address here - what is the temporal character of its address to us, 
citizen-subjects of Western capitalist democracies? How does it 
inscribe us into historical time, today?4 
1. THE POETRY OF TRANSITION 
Let me quote what is probably - in the wake of Marshall Berman's 
path-breaking work - the most cited passage from the Communist 
Manifesto, in a Western academic context, over the last 15 years: 
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part. The 
bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patri- 
archal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that 
bound men and women to their 'natural superiors', and has left remaining no other 
nexus between people than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'. It has 
drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, 
of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy waters of egotistical calculation. It has 
resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless 
indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - 
Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, 
it has substituted naked, shameless, direct brutal exploitation. [. . . The 
bourgeoisie] has been the first to show what human activity can bring abour. It has 
accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and 
Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former 
Exoduses of nations and crusades. 
And now, what is for Berman the most important part: 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of 
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole 
relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered 
form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial 
classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois 
epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is 
holy is profaned, and men and women are at last compelled to face with sober 
senses, their real conditions of life, and their relations with their kind.5 
More specifically, according to Marx in the passage which follows, this 
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'constant revolutionising' has three main effects: economic and cultural 
globalization; subjection of the countryside to the towns; and political 
centralization in the form of new state-led or state-created nations. 
What is this but - as Berman describes it in the subtitle of his fine book 
- 'the experience of modernity'? 
The culture of capital is the systemic instantiation of a 
Mephistophelean spirit of negation. And what is the Communist 
Manifesto from the standpoint of such a negation - a Manifesto 
without belief in the world-historical agency of the working classes, 
and with an acknowledgement of the powers of states and capitals to 
contain what had appeared to Marx as ultimately unmanageable crises; 
what is the Communist Manifesto in this context - in which the 
'sorcerer' of modern society has regained a certain crucial measure of 
control over its powers - but, as Berman puts it, 'the archetype of a 
century of modernist manifestoes and movements to come . . . the first 
great modernist work of art'zb When, in his Preface to the 1893 Italian 
edition of the Manifesto, Engels wrote of Dante as 'both the last poet 
of the Middle Ages and the first poet of modern times', in order to 
conjure the prospect of the 'new Dante, who will mark the hour of 
birth of this new proletarian era', he was appealing to national 
sentiment in Italy. Yet it is hard to read this passage without imputing 
a reference (if only unconscious) to Marx and to the Manifesto itself. 
However, if the era that was approaching was not in fact a proletarian 
one, but rather one of capitalism on a !global scale, what does Marx 
become, if not the poet of the transition to capitalism; a prefiguration, 
in epic mode, of Baudelaire and Flaubert? The Manifesto appears as a 
work of modernist historiography: the experience of mid nineteenth- 
century European capitalism, writ large. 
As Berman argues, the Manifesto's prose is driven by, and expresses 
in dissident form, a relentless temporal logic of negation, which 
derives, historically, from the logic of capital itself. Once the histori- 
cally-specific political demands, and corresponding social content, of 
such a manifesto are set aside or judged to be superceded, it would 
seem, it cannot but appear (as it appears to Berman) in its pure 
modernist form, as an idpntzFcation with, and will to, this abstract 
temporal logic itself. As I have argued elsewhere, in its purest form, 
modernism simply is the cultural affirmation of the abstract temporal 
logic of negation.' Think, for example, of the first great Russian 
Futurist Manifesto of 19 12, the Hylaea group's wonderfully entitled 
Slap in the Face ofPublic Taste, with the second of its 'orders' regarding 
poets' rights: the right to 'feel an insurmountable hatred for the 
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language existing before their time'. Or  of the yearning, at once 
theoretically abstract and phenomenologically concrete, expressed in 
the great concluding sentence of the first Man$sto of Surrealism 
(1 924): 'Existence is elsewhere'.' 
The 'melting vision' of Berman's modernist Marx extends beyond 
the specific futurities of qualitative historical novelty in the name of 
which such manifestoes are written (be they communist, futurist, or 
surrealist), to a generalised existential modernism that dissolves 
political subjectivity into the movement of time itself. Berman's Marx 
is, in this respect, rather surprisingly, something of a poststructuralist 
Marx. This is a modernism which celebrates in ecstatic fashion 
the glory of modern energy and dynamism, the ravages of modern disintegration 
and nihilism, the strange intimacy between them; the sense of being caught in a 
vortex where all facts and values are whirled, exploded, decomposed, recombined; 
a basic uncertainty about what is basic, what is valuable, even what is real; a flaring 
up of the most radical hopes in the midst of their radical negations.' 
'Time is everything, man is nothing; at the most, he is time's carcase. 
Quality no longer  matter^."^ Or  at least, that's how it looks from the 
standpoint of the 'fact' of modern industry. But is this standpoint all 
that's left after the demise of the proletariat as the agent of history? Is 
there really no time lefi in the Manifesto, for us, today, other than the 
time of capital, culturally generalised into that of an abstract, badly 
infinite modernity? No time other than that of the new as the 'ever- 
same', as Benjamin put it; the new as 'an invariant: the desire for the 
new', in Adorno's words?" Is there no time other than the time of 
'uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncer- 
tainty and agitation', which is nonetheless, mysteriously, somehow 
restricted in its play to the compass of a single social form (capitalism)? 
No time but that of the expanded reproduction of capital, the 
relentless self-expansion of the value-form? Is there no place lefi in the 
text of the Manifesto, for us, today, for another time, a qualitatively 
different time, a different kind of futurity, a historicalfiturity, closer to 
the text's original intent? 
It is hard to pursue such questions without running into a barrier: 
the theoretical failure of Marxism to address the question of 'history' 
as a problem about the character of historical time. The Marxist 
tradition has tended either to reject the field of the philosophy of 
history as such, in the name of a temporally naive notion of historio- 
graphy as a science (in which the hture appears only as an extrapolation 
of past and present within a naturalised chronological time - never as 
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a dimension of social being in its own right); or to adopt the temporal 
structure of Hegelianism (the eternal present as the standpoint of 
absolute knowing). More ofien, it has tried to do both at once. 
Marxism lacks a philosophically adequate conception of historical 
time.I2 Yet, in the text of the Manifesto, historical time, a qualitative 
historical time, looms large; not merely in the sense of the historian, 
the sense of the past ('The history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggles'), but in the existential sense of a universalised 
demand on the future, dynamised by the present, claiming that future 
for itself: 'In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class 
antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free devel- 
opment of each is the condition for the free development of all.' We 
shall have . . . a non-capitalist future. This is a demand not unlike that 
about which Kant writes in the Critique of j+ent: the 'strange' 
demand made by the reflective judgment of singularity which requires 
agreement from all." It would be a mistake to take this 'we shall have' 
for a prediction, in any straightforward sense of the term. The 
Manifesto displays, in a practical form, a sophistication about historical 
time which is lacking from Marx's methodological writings about 
history. 
There is a powerful existential dimension to the Communist 
Manifesto, a particular quality offiturity, which, as Berman recognises, 
belies the sociological schematism and historical stagism of its account 
of classes and modes of production. Berman's reading focuses on this 
dimension. Indeed, it celebrates it. Yet it also dehistoricises it - takes 
the history out of it - in a very particular way. It dehistoricises its 
futurity, its identification with qualitative historical novelty, by 
reducing it to the abstract temporal logic of negation of a generalised 
modernity. In fact, paradoxically, it dehistoricises it (the quality of its 
futurity) in the very act of purporting to explain it, historically, as the 
cultural affect of a particular form of social time: the time of the 
expanded reproduction of capital, the revolutionary temporality of the 
bourgeoisie. The impulse towards a different future, a non-capitalist 
future, is thus evacuated from the text, not merely by Berman's 
notorious neglect of its historical argumentation (the class struggle), 
but at the level of its temporal-existential form as well. Berman's 
reading partakes in the dehistoricising movement of the purely existen- 
tialist, heroic modernism which it purports to explain. Yet what 
meaning can Marx's 'we shall have' possess - a 'we shall have' of quali- 
tative historical novelty - today, when the horizon of socialist 
revolution has disappeared? What meaning can it have except, as 
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Berman implies, that of an abstractly energising hope, circulating 
within the closed walls of the disintegrative turbulence of capitalist 
societies themselves? Or  to put the same question another way: from 
where else might the existential force of the Manifesto derive? 
One way to approach this question is through an analysis of the 
temporality of the text as a historical and cultural form.I4 
2. MONTAGE AND MEDIATION IN 
THE MANIFESTO FORM 
The first thinn to note is that the Communist Manifeso is the syncretic 
- 
product of a number of pre-existing, historically discrete literary forms, 
each of which represents a separate compositional element, the history 
ofwhich may be traced through the Manifesto's relations to earlier texts 
and manuscipt materials by Marx and Engels themselves. To begin 
with, for example, one might attend to the text's origins in the 
catechism form of Engels' Principles of Communism (October 1847), 
which was a revised version of his own earlier Draft of a Communist 
Confession ofFaith, from June of the same year - the written-up version 
of the draft programme discussed at the First Congress of the 
Communist League. Comparison of the three documents reveals 
successive transformations of the catechism form as it is progressively 
subordinated to, and integrated into, a narrative form. Thus, the first 
version (June 1847) begins: 
Question 1: Are you a Communist? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question 2: What is the aim of the Communists? 
Answer: To organize society in such a way that every member of it can develop and 
use all his [/he4 capacities and powers in complete freedom and without thereby 
infringing the basic conditions of society. 
Question 3: How do you wish to achieve this aim? 
Answer: By elimination of private property and its replacement by common 
property. . . I5  
This is a suitable form for a secret society - as the League of the Just 
had been, out of which the Communist League emerged - or a 
religious sect. It is a formal, repetitive, ritualised dialogue form. 
In Engels' second version, four months later, this has become: 
Question 1: What is Communism? 
Answer: Communism is the doctrine of the conditions for the emancipation of the 
proletariat. 
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Question 2: What is the proletariat? 
Answer: The proletariat is that class of society which . . . I b  
The mode of address has been generalised and objectivised. The 
content of the dialogue is no longer focused on the existential 
dimension of being and acting, on becoming a communist - a 
confession of faith - but on the principles of the doctrine itself. We 
have moved from the cellar into the schoolroom. 
In the final version, the Manifesto itself, mainly written by Marx in 
January 1848, after a brief period of collaboration with Engels the 
previous month, there is a dramatic shift of register into the famous 
Gothic narrative mode: 
A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old 
Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, 
Metternich and Guizot, French radicals and German police spies. . . 
Or, if you prefer to take section one as the proper beginning, into a 
sweeping historical panorama: 
The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. 
Freeman and slave, patrican and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to 
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open, a fight that each 
time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes. 
Only at the very end of section two, nearly two thirds of the way 
through the text as a whole, do we find the programmatic list df 
measures that the communists plan to undertake (this is another 
embedded form: the political programme). By comparison, the DraJz 
of a Communist Confession of Faith placed the demands of the 
movement up front, although it stated them only in the most general 
terms. Moreover, here, in the Manifesto, these demands are subordi- 
nated to a wider narrative, within which they are but a transitional 
moment, extending into a qualitatively different future, which 
climaxes with an account of what it is that 'we shall have' in place of 
the old bourgeois society: 'an association, in which the free devel- 
opment of each is the condition for the free development of all.' The 
temporal locus of the text is no longer the eternal present of secret 
society or schoolroom, but the contradictory historical present of 
capitalist societies, packed tight with the productive energies of human 
history and the accumulated memories of struggles between classes, 
bursting with the anticipation of a specific future (communism). 
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Yet the existential dimension of the earlier versions persists, not 
merely in the phenomenological force of the descriptions of the revolu- 
tionary temporality of capitalist societies (highlighted by Berman) and 
the degradation of labour within them (which he ignores), but in the 
intermittent irruption into the narrative of the 'we' and the 'you': the 
registration in direct speech of the displaced survival of the catechism, 
through which the contradictions of the historical process are given 
voice in rhetorical form. There is a subtle interweaving within the text 
of the Manifesto of what Benveniste distinguishes with his technical use 
of the terms 'narrative' and 'discourse': where discourse is a linguistic 
form marked by the temporal proximity of its objects to the present of 
its utterance, while narrative cultivates temporal distance and objec- 
tivity, through the preferential use of the third person, along with the 
aorist, imperfect and pluperfect tenses, avoiding the present, perfect 
and future.I7 This is in many ways a problematic distinction, theoreti- 
cally, but it is useful here nonetheless, to register the shifts between 
verb tenses and modes of address within the Manifesto, through which 
the enormous weight of its narrative content (history as the history of 
modes of production and the conflicts between their constitutive social 
classes) is brought to bear on the point of the present of reading. 
Section two of the Manifesto begins in the schoolmasterly, question- 
and-answer mode of Engels' Principles of Communism - 'In what 
relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?' - 
but as the answer develops, voices proliferate. Objections interject ('Do 
you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a 
form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? . . . Or do you 
mean modern bourgeois property?), multiply ('But does wage labour 
create any property for the labourer?'), and are rebuffed ('Not a bit. It 
creates capital.', etc). The text becomes the site of an argument in the 
fullest sense of the word, as the reader is pulled back and forth between 
different standpoints within the overall narrative flow. 
Allied to this is the complex universality and singularity of the text's 
'we'. Not only is the dialogical 'you' - 'You are horrified at our 
intending to do away with private property' - multiple and flexible, 
projecting the reader into the position of various objectors, but Marx 
also clearly exploits the fourth of the poets' rights ordered by the first 
of the Russian Futurist manifestoes (referred to above): namely, the 
right 'to stand on the rock of the word "we" amidst the sea of boos 
and outrage'.'' This rock is only rarely inhabited these days; people fear 
the colonialising impulses it arouses. Yet Marx's 'we' is at once differ- 
ential and cumulative. It is the authorial 'we' of the writer; the more 
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inclusive 'we' of author and readers (the 'we' of 'as we have seen, 
above'); the specific and strongly distinguishing 'we' of 'we commu- 
nists'; and finally, climactically, it is the universal 'we' of the 'we shall 
have', which is also the 'we' of what we shall have: namely, 'an associ- 
ation in which the free development of each [each '1'1 is the condition 
for the free development of all' - the 'we' of an absolute (one might say, 
a 'philosophical') universality via which the reader passes, almost 
without noticing, into the standpoint of a post-capitalist historical 
view; a 'we' through which we readers, in the present, are offered an 
oppositional political identity within the present, through identifi- 
cation with the individuated universality of a 'we' of the future: 'an 
association in which . . . each . . . for . . . all'. 
Finally, one might mention the length of the text, the duration of 
reading and conceiving. The Manifesto's combination of brevity (a 
mere fourteen thousand words), with breadth (human societies past 
and future), characteristic of the manifesto as a form, produces a 
vibrant imagism at the heart of the narrative, as vast swathes of 
historical experience are condensed into single images: 'a11 that is solid 
melts into air'. The brevity of the text seals it up into an autonomous 
totality which figures history as a whole, producing an eschatological 
effect similar to that described by Walter Benjamin in his account of 
the production of 'now-time' out of the ruptural force of the dialectical 
image: the image at 'the now of recognisability', as he called it in his 
Arcades Project.' 
It is surprising that Benjamin lefi us without a reading of the 
Communist Maniferto, without doubt the most 'Benjaminian' of Marx's 
texts, and, one might argue, the high point of the German Romantic 
influence on Marx. (The essence of Romanticism, for Benjamin, lay in 
its rnes~ianism.)~~ Yet Benjamin did leave us an account of capitalist 
modernity as cultural meltdown - 'a vast process in which literary 
forms are being melted down"' - in his writings of the 1920s and 30s. 
And he connected this meltdown, explicitly, to new experiences of 
time, associated with the interacting forces of commodification, 
technology and urbanism (one might add, migration); forces which 
gave rise to new media and forms of representation (photography, film, 
newspapers, advertisments) in relation to which the history of the 
manifesto form itself must be located. If Dadaism was an attempt to 
match the effects of film within the (technically obsolete) medium of 
painting,22 so the Manifesto may be understood as an attempt to invent 
a literary form of political communication appropriate to a period of 
mass politics on an international scale. (Ease of translation is an 
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important feature of the directness of its style.) 'One of the foremost 
tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand which could be 
fully satisfied only later'23 - in this case, by television. 
The sense of an autonomous totality, produced by the sweeeping 
historical overview of the first two sections of the Manifesto (sections 
three and four are in many ways programmatic appendages), has all the 
radically temporalising qualities associated by Benjamin with the 
timelessness of the dialectical image. We find a similar historiographical 
timelessness, or absolutization of narrative unity via a deregulation of 
the play of the opposition of 'narrative' to 'discourse', in Rancikre's 
reading of Michelet as the historian of 'the absolute nominal phrase', 
which abolishes temporal markers in order to absolutize the meaning of 
the present.24 The temporality of the Manifesto cannot be reduced to 
that of the absolute nominal phrase; it is far more internally complex 
than that. Yet a not dissimilar effect is produced by its first two sections 
as a whole, by their imagistic force. They function much like a history 
painting, a triptych, in which images of past, present, and future 
coalesce as tensely interacting forms. In fact, one could argue that this 
peculiar effect of radical futurity via temporal suspension is a feature of 
the absolutism of the manifesto form in general, in which, as Tristan 
Tzara put it, one must 'organize prose into a form that is absolutely and 
irrefutably obvious'.25 A manifesto being, on Tzara's definition: 'a 
communication made to the whole world, whose only pretension is the 
discovery of an instant cure for political, astronomical, artistic, parlia- 
mentary, agronomical and literary syphilis . . . it is always right.'26 A 
manifesto is primarily a performance. (Tzara, incidentally, declared 
himself to be as against manifestos, 'in principle', as he was 'against 
prin~iples'.)~' The Communist Manifesto is distinguished by the way it 
offsets the arbitrariness of the literary absolutism inherent in the 
manifesto form (demonstrated so brilliantly by Tzara) with historical 
argumentation woven throughout both its narrative and discursive 
modes. Ultimately, however, the force of this argument is dependent 
upon the structure of experience constructed by the manifesto form. 
Marx drew on a multiplicity of received forms to forge the 'absolute 
obviousness' of the Communist Manifesto: the catechism, the historical 
narrative, the gothic tale, the political~programme - to which one 
might add the critique (the critique of political economy, condensed 
into the description of capitalism) and the literary review (of previous 
socialist and communist literature, in section three). Six different 
literary forms, at least, fused together within the framework of a 
seventh: the manifesto. The Communist Manifesto is a montage. It 
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stages 'a rebirth of the epic out of the technique of m~ntage'.~' More 
specifically, it constructs a complex existential mediation of historical 
time through a syncretic combination of historically discrete literary 
forms, each of which retains an aspect of autonomy within the whole. 
It embodies a historical hturity of qualitative newness, independent of 
its penultimate narrative act (proletarian revolution), in the historical 
dimension of its cultural form. Add to this, the contextual dimension 
of its reception - the way in which meaning is produced as an articu- 
lation or reorganisation of existing structures of experience - and one 
begins to get a sense of the extraordinary density of historical relations 
which underlie and animate the apparent simplicity of its appeal. None 
of this is registered in Berman's modernist reading; brilliant as it is in 
its (ironically) limited way. 
There is a complex plurality of times at play in the Manifesto in 
addition to the revolutionary temporality of capital; forms of tempo- 
rality which survive the demotion in the historical role of its main 
character (the proletariat, purported agent of the new era); forms of 
futurity which construct the prospect of the qualitative historical 
novelty of a post-capitalist society out of the experience of the contra- 
dictions of the existing social form. Berman's Marx, on the other hand, 
is a one-dimensional modernist, in thrall to the disintegrative effects of 
time itself. Berman's reading of the Manifesto aims to 'give modernist 
art and thought a new solidity and invest its creations with an unsus- 
pected resonance and depth.'29 Yet it is the pure temporal modernism 
of the desire for the new, the new as an invariant, alone, which he 
uncovers; thereby robbing the Manifesto of its distinctive historical 
resonance and depth. For the Manifesto surely belongs to another 
modernism, to what Jeff Wall has called 'the dream of a modernism 
with social content', an 'openly socially critical modernist art',M in 
which formal innovation is a reflective but nonetheless constructive play 
with the culturally mediated aspects of social forms; a modernism for 
which form is the medium for the expression of the contradictions of 
historically specific social relations. This dream continues to inspire a 
diverse array of cultural projects. It serves well as a description of 
Walter Benjamin's work. The idea that cultural forms are sites for the 
articulation of social contradictions is central to such a dream. I would 
therefore like to end with some brief remarks about the absence from 
Berman's reading of the Manifesto of the contradictory social content 
underlying the revolutionary temporality of capital; an absence which, 
read symptomatically, draws our attention to certain crucial 
weaknesses within the Manz9sto itself. 
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3. UTOPIANISM AND 'SOBER SENSE' 
It is a remarkable feature of Berman's reading of the Manifesto that 
while it restricts itself to the horizon of capital (positing capital as the 
source of its utopian energy), it is nonetheless parasitic on a utopian 
vision that is integrally connected to Marx's discourse on communism, 
a discourse which Berman neglects. This is the sleight of hand that 
transfigures Marx's appreciation of the enormous, but relative, 
historical advance of capitalism into an absolutizution of its produc- 
tivity, independent of its status as a historical (and therefore, of 
necessity, eventually a passing) social form. Berman transfers the 
'absolutism' of the Manifesto's theoretical and literary form wholly onto 
capital, yet, from the standpoint of the text's narrative structure, the 
(socially contradictory) productivity of capitalism appears as a 
historical advance only from the point of view of a post-capitalist 
future; a point of view that Berman's Marx can no longer sustain. In 
this respect (with regard to the temporal logic of the text), Berman's 
reading suffers from a fatal incoherence: it invests capital with a 
utopian charge which cannot, even theoretically, be redeemed. Hence 
its reduction of utopianism to energetics: 'the glory of modern energy 
and dynamism, the ravages of modern disintegration and nihilism', 
and 'the strange intimacy between them'. What Berman leaves out is 
any account of the social sources of the dynamism of capital, the 
revolutionary temporality of which he celebrates. 
The reason this was possible lies within the Manijkto itself: in a 
series of systematic slippages and contradictions in its treatment of the 
relations between its four main ideas: the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, 
communism and capital. Space prohibits a proper discussion of these 
relations here. Suffice to say, the Manifesto: (1) conflates the 
bourgeoisie with capital; while (2) placing the proletariat outside of 
capital (neglecting its existence as variable capital); thereby (3) 
enabling a conflation of the proletariat with communism; while (4) 
reducing capitalism to the logic of capital (neglecting its articulations 
with other, historically received social forms). As a result, its inherently 
'discursive' futurity is curtailed; subordinated to the proletariat's 
'narrative' role. The dynamism that the Manifesto attributes to the 
bourgeoisie ('i.e. capital', as the English translation has it at one point) 
must actually be considered an effect of the dialectic of social classes, 
as structured, not only by the conditions of capital accumulation, but 
by the totality of social relations obtaining at any particular time. 
(Think of the importance of immigration to the history of capitalism, 
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for example; not simply in the paradigm-case of the USA, but as a 
whole.) The power of capital to annihilate received social forms has 
turned out to be considerably less absolute (indeed, considerably less 
desirable from the standpoint of the accumulation of capital) than 
Marx supposed. This is one of the main things that the Manifeo 
draws our attention to today, via the failure of its imagined negation: 
the continuing vitality within the most advanced capitalist societies of 
supposedly 'pre-capitalist' social forms. 
It is extraordinary that Berman should choose to absolutise the 
disintegrative, purely abstract temporal modernism of the Manifesto's 
'melting' vision - the elimination of every social bond other than 
'naked self-interest' - at the very moment when a whole complex of 
non-economic (or at least, not immediately economic) social relations 
has come to the fore, politically, in advanced capitalist societies; 
including all those that the Manifesto would have capitalism dissolve 
(religion, occupational status, family, nation, age, sex), along with 
others (such as race and ethnicity) which it fails to mention. This is of 
enormous significance, not only because of what it tells us about the 
importance to capitalism of what the value-form would destroy (or at 
best, ignore) - what Balibar calls 'the binding agents of a historical 
collectivity of individuals', which are subject to a contradictory reinte- 
gration into the circuits of capital3' - but also because of what it has to 
tell us about the constitutive role of fantasy in social and political 
processes. For despite Berman's selection of 'sober sense' as one of the 
most important features of the Manifesto's celebration of capitalism - 
the compulsion of men and women to face 'their real conditions of life 
and their relations with their kind' - sober sense, in this specific sense 
of a theoretically adequate 'demystified' sense, is actually and under- 
standably rather thin on the ground. It is more likely to be via a consid- 
eration of the ineliminability of fantasy and imagination from the 
constitution of social and political identities that the relations between 
jnitude,&turity, and socialform are to be understood. 
The social forms that Marx would have capitalism destroy live on 
within it, transformed, as both points of identification and functioning 
relations, suffused with fantasy in ways which cannot be fully compre- 
hended apart from their 'non-capitalistic dimensions'. For a hture 
beyond capitalism has been figured from its very beginnings, not 
merely by pre-capitalist social forms (romantic anti-capitalism), but in 
the concept ofpolitical community itself. Writing of the experience of 
history made possible by the technology of the photograph, Benjamin 
remarks that 
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the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search . . . for the tiny spark of contingency, 
of the Here and Now, with which reality has so to speak seared the subject, to find 
the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long forgotten moment the 
future subsists so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it.32 
Reading the Communist Manifesto today, one can find a number of 
such spots, not in those parts which are closest to us, but in those 
'sparks of contingen j which now seem farthest away. 
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